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1. The recent conclusion of the Uruguay Round will significantly alter
the competitive conditions in both domestic and international markets.
The purpose of this paper is to explore the competitive results of various
Uruguay Round codes with respect to the Republic of Korea in terms of both its
domestic and external trade, and to draw policy implications and proposals for
action at the domestic and international level from a competition policy
perspective.
2. After briefly describing the evolution and the present state of national
competition policy, we will assess the possible effects of various contingent
protection measures of the Uruguay Round on competition in the Republic of
Korea (and by extension, in other developing countries) and world export
markets. This will be followed by a discussion of competition policy issues
posed by the new world trading system and recent developments in the
competition policy of the Republic of Korea. The paper ends with a proposal
for the next round of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and actions that
UNCTAD and other multilateral organizations can take with the aim of including
competition principles in the future international trading system.
I. KOREAN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY
3. The Republic of Korea is one of the NICs that have successfully
institutionalized its own competition law and policy. In December 1980, the
Government enacted "the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act" (hereafter
"the MRFTA"); it signified a fundamental shift in policy orientation, marking
the beginning of a departure from the government-led economy which prevailed
up to the 1970s, to a full-fledged market economy based on creative activities
of the private sector and free competition. Since then, the Republic of Korea
has actively launched a liberalization policy in various economic fields,
expanding the scope of open trade and investment and promoting competition
among domestic firms.
4. The MRFTA was amended in 1986, 1990, and 1992. The Korea Fair Trade
Commission (hereafter "KFTC"), an administrative agency with quasi-judicial
authority, has broad responsibilities to enforce the MRFTA which is ultimately
enforced by the judicial system. There are five corrective measures which
the KFTC may take against violations of the MRFTA. These include warning,
recommendation for correction, order for correction, order to pay an
administrative surcharge, and request for indictment. Anyone injured by a
violation of the MRFTA is entitled to bring an action for the recovery of
actual damages after corrective measures by the KFTC are finalized. Moreover,
courts can impose criminal penalties on a violator who is indicted and
convicted. Such sanctions range from a fine of up to 100 million won
(approximately US$ 125,000), to a fine of up to 200 million won and/or
imprisonment of up to three years depending on the nature of the violation.
A. The evolution of competition policy
5. The Republic of Korea enjoyed highly successful economic development
during the past several decades under the direct supervision of the
Government. Indeed, the Government took charge of the overall operation of
the economy, regulating and directing a wide range of economic activities in
an attempt to achieve rapid growth under such constraints as a small domestic
market, lack of natural resources, and insufficient financial resources. The
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Government’s economic policies were generally focused on developing specific
industrial sectors by providing direct assistance and protection to selected
industries and firms, in order to make strategic use of available resources.
6. Although the government-driven development strategy often produced the
desired outcome, it was invariably accompanied by adverse side-effects and
market distortions which grew more serious as the economy expanded and became
increasingly complex. Owing to industrial and banking policies that treated
large firms favourably in order to realize scale economies, activities of
small and medium-sized firms were stunted and economic power became
concentrated. With conglomerates expanding and diversifying their business
activities, the monopolistic structure of the market deepened and restrictive
business practices became more common and widespread. The growth-first policy
also widened imbalances among industries, regions, and income classes.
7. In the aftermath of the oil crisis from 1975 to 1979, the Government
further tightened its grip on the economy by adopting widespread price
controls. Hit by the first oil crisis, the country suffered heavily from a
sharp increase in the price of imported raw materials, experiencing high
rates of inflation and demand-supply imbalances in a large number of already
distorted markets. In an effort to cope with this problem, the Act Concerning
Price Stabilization and Fair Trade was enacted in 1975, and the Government
monitored and intervened in individual product markets under this Act.
Extensive price regulation of about 150 monopolistic or oligopolistic products
was carried out annually until 1979. In addition, a price ceiling was
imposed initially on coal briquettes, and then between 1977 and 1978, on more
than 20 other items of daily necessity. 1/
8. Direct price controls on a wide range of commodities, however, went
beyond the limits of administrative capacity and led to a series of problems
and negative side-effects. Long lasting price controls severely hampered
the price mechanism and gave rise to phenomena such as dual pricing and
deterioration of product quality, as well as chronic excess demand. Most of
the regulated firms lost interest in production expansion and capital
investment, which weakened their ability to weather business cycles. Since
prices intermittently climbed sharply in a "stop and go" pattern, neither
producers nor consumers could have reasonable expectations about prices or
plan their activities rationally. This experience, coupled with the aftermath
of the second oil crisis, prompted a reappraisal of the past performance of
the national economy and led to the general consensus that the economy should
be run by the unfettered functioning of the market mechanism in the coming
decades. As a first major step in this direction, the MRFTA was enacted at
the end of 1980, nullifying direct price regulation under the Price
Stabilization Act and setting the comprehensive new "rules of the game" for
the market economy, namely, free and fair competition.
9. Two important issues arose while the MRFTA was being drafted. First,
the general principle of letting the market mechanism determine prices could
not be upheld unless the market structure was competitive. Since the
majority of product markets in the Republic of Korea were monopolistic or
oligopolistic, and price stabilization was regarded as the economic goal of
the first order, the MRFTA eventually specified the prohibition of undue
pricing activities by market-dominating firms and of parallel price increases
by oligopolists. 2
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10. The second issue was over whether to use the MRFTA as legal justification
for a direct attack on the concentration of economic power, embodied and
symbolized by the jaebol. 3/ Despite many divergent opinions on this issue,
most believed that the jaebol issue needed to be addressed. This was
expressed in Article 1 of the Act, which identifies the prevention of
"excessive concentration of economic power" as one of the law’s purposes.
Nevertheless, the MRFTA stopped at regulating business integration which would
cause "substantial injury to competition". Furthermore, the Guidelines for
Business Integration dealt only with horizontal and vertical integration,
omitting conglomerate integration, the most powerful means for the expansion
of business groups. The concentration of corporate ownership, another facet
of economic power, was also left intact. These omissions of the MRFTA were
partially addressed by amendments in 1986 and 1990.
B. Substantive provisions of the MRFTA and their application
11. The MRFTA’s aim according to Article 1 is to encourage free and fair
competition and thereby stimulate creative business activities and protect
consumers, as well as promote balanced development of the national economy by
prohibiting the abuse of market-dominating positions, excessive concentration
of economic power, and unfair business practices. The statute is applicable
to the industries that are specifically listed in Article 2, which include
almost all industries except agriculture, fisheries and mining. Activities
pursuant to other laws and certain activities carried out by trade
associations established for the purpose of mutual support among small
businesses or consumers are exempted from application of the MRFTA.
12. The MRFTA was most recently revised in December 1992. This amendment
introduced limitations on cross debt guarantees between affiliated companies
of conglomerate business groups, exceptions to previous limitations on the
amount of total investment in other companies by these business groups, and
administrative surcharges on unfair business practices. The Enforcement
Decree of the MRFTA was correspondingly revised in February 1993 to limit the
number of business groups subject to limitations on total investment amounts
and debt guarantees to the 30 largest ones according to asset size. It also
raised the standard for designating markets featuring market-dominating
enterprises from annual sales of more than 30 billion won to sales of more
than 50 billion won. Substantive provisions of the MRFTA can be categorized
into eight parts.
13. Article 3 of the MRFTA prohibits a market-dominating firm from
unreasonably setting prices, restraining output, hindering new entry,
eliminating a competitor, or otherwise restricting competition.
Market-dominating firms are annually designated by the KFTC in accordance
with the following criteria: either the market share of the largest firm is
greater than 50 per cent (monopoly) or the combined share of the top three
firms is greater than 75 per cent (duopoly and oligopoly) in a market with
total domestic sales totalling more than 50 billion won. In 1993, 335 firms
in 140 markets were designated as market-dominating firms, and orders for
correction of abusive practices were issued in two cases.
14. Article 7 prohibits firms with equity capital of more than 5 billion won
or total assets of more than 20 billion won from combining with other firms
through stock holdings, interlocking directorates, mergers, asset transfers,
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or the establishment of new companies, 4/ if such combinations are likely to
cause substantial injury to competition in any line of commerce. Exemptions
may be granted by the KFTC where business integration is necessary to
rationalize an industry or strengthen its international competitiveness.
Proposed mergers and asset purchases, as well as the establishment of new
companies, must be reported to the KFTC prior to the transaction, and
acquisitions of more than 20 per cent of a company’s stock and interlocking
directorates must be reported to the KFTC within 30 days after their
completion. Business combinations not required to file notification are
effectively exempt from merger control. A total of 2,429 business
integrations were reported during the period of 1981 to 1993, and in only two
cases was substantial injury to competition declared. 5/ While more than
half of the reported cases were examples of conglomerate integration, they
were not controlled. A revision of the Guidelines for Business Integration
including such cases is being considered.
15. Articles 8 through 11 of the MRFTA, which were introduced in 1986 and
strengthened in 1989, provide for specific measures designed to restrain
excessive expansion of conglomerate business groups and thereby mitigate the
concentration of economic power. Article 8 forbids the establishment of a
holding company, and Article 9 prohibits a company of a conglomerate from
acquiring or owning the stock of an affiliated company which owns the said
company’s stock. Article 10 stipulates that an affiliated company of a
large business group may neither obtain nor hold shares of other domestic
firms in excess of 40 per cent of its net assets. But investments necessary
for enhancing international competitiveness, such as investments for
technology development, are exempted from this restriction by the 1992
amendment. Article 10 (2), which was also added in the 1992 amendment, sets
forth the restrictions on debt guarantees between affiliated companies.
Effective 1 April 1993, the total amount of debt guarantee that a firm
provides for its affiliated companies may not exceed 200 per cent of its own
capital. The large business groups subject to this regulation have a
three-year grace period to reduce debt guarantees that exceed the limit.
Article 11 restricts stock voting rights of banking and insurance companies
affiliated with a conglomerate business group.
16. These provisions apply to 30 largest business groups that the KFTC
designate annually according to total assets. The KFTC now intends to take
into consideration such factors as the number of affiliated companies and the
extent of ownership distribution in addition to total assets in designating
large business groups. It also plans to include government-invested
corporations that were previously excluded from being designated as large
business groups. From 1987 to 1993, orders for correction have been issued
in 30 cases and recommendations for correction in 8 cases.
17. Undue concerted activities among competitors which would substantially
restrain competition in any line of commerce are prohibited under Article 19.
Prohibited activities include collusive agreements on prices and other sales
conditions, outputs, customers and market areas, production capacity,
specialization, and joint operating agencies. An express agreement is not
required to establish a violation of the provision; the existence of a
restrictive agreement can be inferred from parallel behaviour in appropriate
circumstances. The KFTC may impose an administrative surcharge on colluding
firms to a value not exceeding 1 per cent of the total sale of the product
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during the period in which the cartel was effectively maintained. By 1993,
95 undue collective activities were remedied, and about half of them involved
price fixing.
18. Parties to a restrictive agreement may apply to the KFTC for prior
approval of the agreement, and the KFTC can grant exemption if the proposed
concerted activities are deemed necessary for the purpose of rationalizing a
specific industry, overcoming cyclical recessions, facilitating industrial
restructuring, enhancing the competitive viability of small and medium-sized
firms, promoting research and development, or rationalizing terms of
transactions. Offering discretionary exemptions to restrictive agreements can
be regarded as a strong form of rule of reason treatment and is practised
primarily where the law accommodates goals other than the maintenance of
competition. As of the end of 1993, only five exempted cartels were in
existence.
19. Article 23 declares six kinds of business practices as unfair, and
Article 29 forbids resale price maintenance except for publications covered by
the Copyright Act and goods approved by the KFTC. The KFTC has issued several
public notices specifying the types of business practices which are unfair and
therefore subject to prohibition. The public notices currently in force are
"Public Notice on Designation of General Unfair Business Practices", "Specific
Unfair Business Practices in the Department Store Business", "Marking of
Suppliers for Gas Stations", "Public Notice on Discount Sales", and "Types and
Standards of Unfair Business Practices Concerning the Provision of Promotional
Gifts". Whereas vertical price restraints have consistently been treated as
illegal per se, non-price vertical restraints have been judged under the rule
of reason since 1992.
20. The KFTC has been very active in enforcing Articles 23 and 29. During
the 1981-1993 period, it issued corrective orders in 714 cases and corrective
recommendations in 550 cases for engagement in unfair business practices. Of
these, there were 98 cases of resale price maintenance, 329 cases of false or
misleading advertising, 32 cases of refusal to deal, 97 cases of exclusive
dealing or territorial restriction, 116 cases of tying, price discrimination,
boycotting, or other unfair practices, 260 cases of offering excessive
promotional gifts, and 244 cases of undue or deceptive discount sales.
21. Article 26 extends prohibitions on undue concerted activities and
unfair business practices to trade associations and their members. In
addition, it prohibits trade associations from limiting the number of firms
and unreasonably restricting the business activities of member firms. As
of the end of 1993, there were 1,571 trade associations, a sharp increase
from 467 in 1970, and trade associations were engaged rather extensively
in various types of anticompetitive or unfair business practices. In
the 1981-1993 period, a total of 123 correction orders and 31 correction
recommendations were issued against trade associations.
22. Article 32 prohibits individual firms and trade associations from
entering into international contracts that contain undue concerted activities,
unfair trade practices or resale price maintenance. The KFTC has issued
public notices describing the types of potentially anticompetitive or unfair
business practices in international contracts. Parties to a technology
licensing, distributorship, or copyright inducement contract (excluding
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contracts on books, records and films) where the contract meets specified
duration and royalty standards are subject to the notification requirement.
If anti-competitive or unfair contractual provisions are discovered, the
KFTC initially advises the parties to modify such provisions and may order
modification or cancellation if the parties do not comply. This is only the
case, however, provided that the KFTC has sufficient reason to believe that
the negative impact of such provisions would be substantial.
23. Article 63 of the MRFTA stipulates that central administrative
authorities are required to consult with the KFTC before they enact, amend, or
issue a law, decree, or administrative measure that is likely to restrain
competition. Competition-restraining laws and regulations are those that give
rise to undue collaborative activities or restrict the number of business
concerns in a specific sector. This provision serves as a major vehicle for
the KFTC in preventing the promulgation of new regulations that unreasonably
suppress competition and advocating competition principles in the government
rule-making process. During the 1981-1993 period, there were 897 cases of
consultation, of which 196 were rectified.
II. COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND
24. Doing business in today’s world economy is becoming increasingly global.
Firms are using new combinations of trade, investment, and collaborative
arrangements to expand internationally, enter new markets, and exploit
technological and organizational advantages as widely as possible, and these
new patterns of firms’ activities involve ever-increasing international flows
of goods, services, investment, technology, and people.
25. The recent conclusion of the Uruguay Round trade negotiations reflects a
willingness to adjust the multilateral trading system to these new realities
of doing business globally. In particular, it has broken new ground in the
three areas of services, investment, and intellectual property, all of which
profoundly affect the competitive viability of firms in world markets. The
chief merit of the GATT and the TRIMs agreements lies in the placement of
services and investment-related rule-making under the purview of the
multilateral trading system, thereby providing a basis for further
liberalization. The TRIPs agreement implicitly recognizes that the ability to
make strategic use of intellectual property rights is an important factor
affecting trade and investment decisions which are of paramount importance to
global firms. Thus its aim is to address problems linked to inadequate
patent, copyright, and trademark regimes, which have been a growing source of
international friction. This significantly enhances the protection afforded
to firms investing, producing, and trading in R & D-intensive goods and
services.
26. Although substantial progress has been made in strengthening intellectual
property protection and reducing the height of "traditional" trade barriers,
significant impediments to doing business remain across a wide range of
products and countries. Of particular concern to many developing countries is
that the Antidumping Code, Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures,
and Agreement on Safeguards all fall short of addressing significant
anticompetitive aspects of contingent protection measures.
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27. Trade law remedies have been increasingly imposed by the authorities
in the United States, the European Union, Canada and Australia on the Republic
of Korea’s major export items, including electronics, steel products,
chemicals, plastics, textiles, albums, and footwear. Antidumping measures are
the most frequently used means of restricting competition from the Republic
of Korea’s exporters. In 1992, for instance, antidumping measures were taken
in 37 cases against 32 items, while safeguards were invoked in 14 cases, and
countervailing duties in one case. There has also been strong political
pressure on the Government of the Republic of Korea to implement "voluntary
export restraints" (VERs) in order to restrain its exports. In response to
such demands, the Government of the Republic of Korea has imposed VERs in
areas such as electronics, automobiles, steel, textiles, and others. In 1992,
about 15 per cent of the Republic of Korea’s export trade with developed
countries was covered by contingent protection measures and other restrictive
agreements; the relative importance of those products subject to trade law
remedies in export to developed countries has been declining over the past
five years.
28. An important issue regarding various trade law remedies is that of
thresholds - the degree of import penetration below which restrictive action
should not be taken, the margin of dumping or of subsidization below which no
action should be taken, and the minimum impact below which no action should be
taken. GATT Articles VI (antidumping and countervailing duty) and XIX
(protection against intolerable increases of imports of particular products)
are exceptions to the general rules and should be interpreted as such. A
raising of the thresholds for trade law remedies would help to ensure that
contingent protection measures will only be taken when the quantities involved
are relatively substantial.
29. The new de minimis margin of dumping agreed to in the Uruguay Round
is 2 per cent (expressed as a percentage of the export price), below which
antidumping duties shall not be imposed. When compared with the current
non-codified practice of various countries, however, the 2 per cent standard
does not appear to offer any improvement from the viewpoint of exporting
countries. A change in United States law will be required to raise the
existing 0.5 per cent de minimis standard to 2 per cent, but it is unlikely
that this will have a meaningful impact on the vast majority of United States
cases in practical terms. Some United States experts have argued that the
de minimis dumping margin, for example, should be 5 per cent. 6/ Moreover,
it is established practice in the European Union and Canada to consider
dumping margins of less than 1.5 per cent to be de minimis. While Australia
does not have a formal de minimis margin rule, in one case the Australian
authorities referred to 5 per cent margin as "quite insignificant", and in
another case they referred to a 6.25 per cent margin as "so small". Duties
were not imposed in either case.
30. The de minimis market share under the antidumping provisions
is 3 per cent. That is, the volume of dumped exports shall normally be
regarded as negligible if the volume of dumped imports from a particular
country is found to account for less than 3 per cent of the imports of the
like product in the importing country unless countries which individually
account for less than 3 per cent of the imports collectively account for more
than 7 per cent of the imports. These figures are no higher than those
applied by some countries, and lower than those applied by others. The
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inclusion of a de minimis market share provision, therefore, will not result
in a substantial departure from current practice, and may actually be a step
back from the perspective of exporting countries. In fact, it has been normal
practice in the United States, the European Union, Canada, and Australia to
consider imports to be "negligible" when they represent a limited share of the
domestic market. The United States and the European Union generally dismiss
cases on the basis of de minimis market share when imports account for less
than 1 per cent of the domestic market. The Australian antidumping
authorities have dismissed cases where imports accounted for as much as
10 per cent of the domestic market, stating that "[t]he Authority has
difficulty in accepting that import penetration of such a magnitude was
sufficient to cause material injury." It is more difficult to clearly discern
the pattern used by Canada, although cases have been dismissed where imports
accounted for as much as 4.6 per cent of the domestic market.
31. The de minimis subsidy provision sets the minimum level of 1 per cent
ad valorem (2 per cent for developing countries). Again, an examination of
current practice in countries levying countervailing duties suggests that this
may be no great improvement. Indeed, some United States experts have argued
for a 5 per cent de minimis level for domestic subsidies. 7/
32. Another systemic issue is the nature of causal links between disputed
imports and observed adverse impact. Article VI of the GATT authorizes the
use of offsetting duties when dumped or subsidized imports "cause or threaten
material injury", and Article XIX refers to imports which "cause or threaten
serious injury". A determination of injury for the purposes of Article VI is
to be based on positive evidence and involve an objective examination of both
the volume of the dumped imports and the effect of the dumped imports on
prices in the domestic market for like products, and the consequent impact of
these imports on domestic producers. There remains the likelihood that the
causality between dumped imports and injury will be misdiagnosed, as injury
caused by other factors can be attributed to the dumping at issue.
33. An investigation of any alleged dumping under Article VI shall be
initiated if the application for it is supported by domestic producers
whose collective output constitutes more than 50 per cent of the total
production by that portion of the domestic industry expressing either
support for or opposition to the application. No investigation can be
initiated if domestic producers expressly supporting the application account
for less than 25 per cent of total production. A troublesome factor in this
process is that employees of domestic producers or representatives of those
employees may make or support an application for an investigation. This gives
rise to a serious concern that the antidumping system may be systematically
abused by labour unions in an effort to secure their jobs.
34. It is agreed that any definitive antidumping duty (or price undertaking)
shall be terminated on a date not later than five years from its imposition.
There is some lingering doubt, however, that this will actually prevent the
prolonged imposition of antidumping duties, since the antidumping authorities
can review the need for their continued imposition by their own initiative or
upon request by any interested party. Authorities may then decide to keep the
protective measures in force if they determine that their expiration would
probably lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury.
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35. It is widely agreed that a margin of dumping may have been artificially
created under the antidumping system. If prices are fluctuating in the
domestic market, the "normal price" calculated by the use of averages in the
domestic market of the exporter will be higher than some prices in individual
export transactions, even if the export transactions precisely mirror the
domestic sales; thus an artificial margin of dumping will come into existence.
Problems also exist in the use of "cost of production" of the goods to
determine "normal price" when there are not sufficient sales in the home
market to calculate "normal value"; under the United States rules, it is
provided that such "cost of production" must include an allowance for profit
of not less than 8 per cent, regardless of the normal profits in the exporting
industry, or the firm, or the industry in the importing country.
36. The danger of dumping margins being artificially created is somewhat
reduced under the antidumping code of GATT 1994. Sales of the like product in
the domestic market of the exporting country or to a third country at prices
below per unit costs of production plus selling, general, and administrative
costs, may be treated as being outside the ordinary course of trade by reason
of price and thus disregarded in determining normal value only if the
authorities determine that such sales are made within an extended period of
time in substantial quantities and at prices which do not provide for the
recovery of all costs within a reasonable period of time. If prices which are
below costs at the time of sale are above weighted average costs for the
period of investigation, such prices shall be considered to provide for
recovery of costs within a reasonable period of time. Costs shall normally be
calculated on the basis of records kept by the exporter or producer under
investigation, provided that such records are in accordance with the generally
accepted accounting principles of the exporting country and reasonably reflect
the costs associated with the production and sale of the product.
III. NEW DIMENSIONS OF COMPETITION POLICY IN
THE NEW WORLD TRADING SYSTEM
37. As traditional trade barriers are reduced and globalization progresses,
markets tend to become more integrated and competition stiffer. Foreign
competition serves as an expedient and efficient check on competitive abuses
by domestic firms, especially for a small open economy where domestic markets
are often highly concentrated. However, trade and investment liberalization
together with the general trend of globalization pose significant competition-
related issues. The growth of intra-firm and intra-network trade provides
global firms with a wider range of opportunities to exert market power and
engage in anticompetitive practices such as market sharing. The strategic use
of intangible assets such as production technology and intellectual property
rights may confer market power and can be used to monopolize markets by
eliminating competitors. Mergers and acquisitions, which represent a primary
means of securing market presence, may increase concentration and promote
oligopoly and oligopsony. Multinational vertical linkages may effectively
foreclose access to a market, and strategic alliances - especially in
high-technology sectors - may also provide a vehicle for segmenting markets or
achieving a dominant position.
38. While globalization and the positive outcome of the Uruguay Round trade
negotiations are likely to bring about more intense competition, they will
not necessarily ensure competitive market behaviour and efficient outcomes.
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As firms attempt to improve or maintain their competitive position in an
increasingly open environment, they may take actions designed to effectively
block competing imports or foreign investors from their domestic market.
39. There are a number of ways to prevent or restrict competition from
foreign rivals. A dominant firm or group of colluding firms may engage in
exclusionary behaviour by practicing predatory pricing or boycotting
distributors or suppliers who deal with foreign firms in order to fend off the
efforts of new rivals trying to get into the market. Some forms of price
discrimination, such as loyalty bonuses, rebates and discounts, may deter
local purchasers from dealing with foreign firms. The trade associations may
also be a matter for concern if they provide a forum for organizing industry
cartels with exclusionary effects on foreign competitors or are used to
discriminate against foreign-controlled domestic companies by limiting their
rights to participate in association activities, thus impairing their ability
to compete.
40. Vertical restraints may also serve as a vehicle for impeding the entry of
foreign firms by foreclosing the market. If incumbent manufacturers have tied
up all retailers, possibly through exclusive dealing arrangements or full
vertical integration, a foreign entrant will have to overcome barriers erected
by the larger amount of capital necessary to set up its own distribution
networks, as well as the costs of learning effects resulting from the greater
efficiency of established retailers over new ones. The minimum efficient
scale of operation for distribution networks may be quite large, requiring the
establishment of nationwide organizations. If a new entrant cannot get access
to existing networks, it may be forced to not only set up its own network, but
also attain the same scale in its manufacturing activities in order to be
efficient. Both the necessary scale economies and capital requirements could
be effective barriers against smaller enterprises seeking to enter new
markets. Alternatively, a producer who controls major distribution channels
may charge foreign rivals a higher price for access to the market, thus
limiting their competitiveness.
41. Similarly, vertical arrangements may be used to secure control of an
essential input, thus denying it to existing or potential rivals. These
rivals would then have to set up or find alternative upstream sources, thus
increasing the capital required and the risks involved in entering the market.
Complete vertical integration may also create barriers and enhance market
power if it prevents downstream entities from substituting lower cost
alternatives to the upstream entity’s product. If the lower cost alternative
happens to be a foreign product, a market access problem may arise.
42. National competition laws and policies are intended to protect and
preserve competitiveness and ensure efficient market outcomes, but they may
not always be able to address effectively some of the problems depicted above.
They may find it difficult to deal with transnational anticompetitive
practices. The relevant conduct, transactions, entities, facts, and economic
impact may well be spread worldwide, thereby giving rise to a number of
jurisdictional problems. Various legal doctrines, including those of
"effects" and "economic unity" have been devised to bridge these omissions.
These are, however, far from being universally and uniformly accepted.
Discovery and fact-finding also create substantial hurdles in investigations.
Of course, a lenient competition policy which condones predatory or
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exclusionary behaviour by domestic firms trying to keep foreign goods,
services, or investment out may effectively serve as a substitute for more
traditional forms of protection.
43. In both cases commercial frictions can arise and trade policy may be
called upon to ensure "fair" trading conditions. This raises the "assignment"
problem since trade policy instruments are often not well-suited to addressing
competition-related issues. In fact, trade policy measures usually generate
even greater distortions, when an antidumping system is captured by
import-competing interests to both dampen the competitive edge of a rival
trying to get into the market and foster collusive behaviour.
44. These issues and their underlying problems represent new dimensions of
competition policy which have yet to elicit a coherent institutional response,
and are reflected in efforts made at unilateral, bilateral, and regional
levels to adapt national competition policies to a globalizing world economy.
The United States Department of Justice in 1992 decided to assert antitrust
jurisdiction over conduct occurring overseas that restrained United States
exports, and recently reaffirmed that it would take a more active stance in
countering harm to United States export commerce. Furthermore, various
legislative proposals aimed at tackling market access issues by making it
easier to use antitrust rules are pending before the United States Congress.
45. At the bilateral level, substantive competition issues have been
discussed between the United States and Japan, first in the Structural
Impediments Initiatives (SII) and more recently in the ongoing Framework
talks. Since the 1980s, there has been growing demand by the United States
Government that the Japanese Government take steps to open its domestic market
to foreign products. Officials and business persons in the United States have
stated that although formal trade barriers such as tariffs and import quotas
were reduced, peculiar structural features in the Japanese market created
market conditions which made access by outside parties extremely difficult.
Such structural features included government regulations. However, the major
issue in such structural factors is restrictive business practices engaged in
by private enterprises, such as exclusive business customs, cross share
holdings, and interlocking directorates among major companies. Dialogue for
Economic Cooperation (DEC) between the Republic of Korea and the United States
has been under way to discuss a number of trade-related aspects of the two
countries’ competition policies.
46. Several bilateral agreements have been concluded to enhance cooperation
between competition authorities. An interesting new feature, called "positive
comity", was included in the 1991 agreement between the United States and
the European Community. This principle goes beyond the conciliation and
cooperation approach provided for in the 1986 OECD Recommendation, in that it
provides that a party which considers itself affected by an anticompetitive
practice taking place in the territory of another party can call upon the
latter to take enforcement actions provided for by its own laws.
IV. DEVELOPMENTS OF THE KOREAN COMPETITION POLICY
47. Since the enactment of the MRFTA, the Government of the Republic of Korea
has been taking steps to transform the government-led economy to a
full-fledged market economy based on free and fair competition. It initiated
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trade and investment liberalization programmes in the early 1980s, and in
the latter part of the 1980s, started to push forward more concrete plans
for easing regulations in individual industrial sectors. When countries
deregulate their economies, established firms may respond by trying to reduce
competition. Therefore competition policies become more important as
deregulation policies are implemented.
48. As markets become increasingly open and integrated through the success of
multilateral negotiations like the Uruguay Round trade negotiations, new
impediments and obstacles to competition, mainly of a private nature, have
started to appear. Transnational firms trading in R & D-intensive goods may,
for example, engage in anticompetitive abuses of intellectual property rights
to monopolize or attempt to monopolize industries. Domestic companies in
sectors where the market is highly concentrated or tightly organized may
behave in a way that effectively impedes new competitors from entering the
market. The interaction between foreign firms and the national systems in
which they operate renders any marked divergence between systems, such as
differences in competition rules, a potential source of friction.
49. All these factors call for, among other things, an even larger role for,
and more extensive coverage of, competition policy, its transparent and
non-discriminatory implementation, and a more integrated approach to
competition issues. The KFTC has taken or plans to take several measures in
these directions.
50. Recognizing that the current notification and review system for
international contracts under the MRFTA could become a potential source of
friction, the KFTC decided to modify the relevant provision. It will submit
to the National Assembly a revised bill on the MRFTA that eliminates the
pre-review process for international contracts so as to extend the principles
of national treatment and non-discrimination to contracts involving foreign
firms. Contracting parties will be able to request prior consultation with
the KFTC to verify that their contracts do not violate the substantive law.
Specific rules to be applied in judging international contracts will be
developed and articulated in order to increase the transparency of the legal
standards in this area.
51. Another, and probably more important, development of competition policy
in the Republic of Korea is the gradual shift to rule-of-reason standards,
away from the rigid per se standards previously used to judge vertical
restraints. This shift also involves a more lenient treatment of premium
offers and other methods of sales promotion. In July 1992, the KFTC issued a
policy statement advising interested parties that territorial restrictions,
unilateral refusals to deal, and quantity forcing would be evaluated according
to rule-of-reason standards. The KFTC is now considering whether to expand
the scope of rule of reason to include other non-price vertical restraints.
Concurrently, the KFTC is utilizing with greater frequency administrative
surcharges to deter firms from engaging in unfair or anticompetitive
arrangements, and is emphasizing enforcement activities against unfair
business practices by large business groups and major government-invested
enterprises. The KFTC also plans to ease restrictions on premiums and other
methods of sales promotion which might place new entrants at a disadvantage
vis-à-vis established firms. The guidelines for Premiums will be revised to
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raise the maximum possible level of premiums that can lawfully be offered to
consumers, and Guidelines for Promotional Sales will be modified so as to give
firms more flexibility in conducting such sales.
52. As the economy of the Republic of Korea is deregulated in a more open
environment, it is expected that there will be an increasing tendency for
competing firms to engage in collusive practices. The KFTC is particularly
concerned about the role that trade associations play in communicating with
government agencies, facilitating licenses, and obtaining information on
internal regulations, and intends to use the MRFTA more aggressively to tackle
collusive practices that exclude new entrants. Investigation of unfair or
exclusionary practices by trade associations is currently under way as part of
the administrative deregulation programme. More specifically, 68 trade
associations are being investigated, and the results will be reported to the
Administrative Deregulation Committee chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister.
The KFTC, relying on the investigation results, will move to eradicate
restrictive trade practices that suppress competition. In addition, the KFTC
is trying to develop effective methods for detecting and preventing bid
rigging on government contracts.
53. The MRFTA requires other administrative agencies to consult with the KFTC
before they legislate or amend laws or administrative decrees that contain
competition-restraining provisions. This competition advocacy programme,
however, has not been implemented satisfactorily, mainly because the
procedural requirements for prior consultation were not specified in detail.
The KFTC is seeking to utilize actively the prior consultation clause by
supplementing detailed rules of the consultative process through the revision
of relevant laws.
54. To encourage corporations to develop MRFTA compliance programmes, the
KFTC plans to consider a corporation’s promulgation, dissemination, and good
faith enforcement of an antitrust compliance programme in determining the
corporate defendant’s intent. Furthermore, it is considering a policy of
lenient treatment for corporations or officers who voluntarily report their
illegal activity prior to detection.
55. There remain a few more tasks for the Republic of Korea’s future
competition policy. First, the KFTC needs to intervene in sectors where the
market is highly concentrated and organized in a way that effectively
suppresses competition. So far, it has not been active in addressing
monopolistic market structures and investigating industries where the KFTC
itself has identified structural barriers. It is sometimes argued that a
monopoly is necessary to obtain efficiency, whereas competition tends to be
wasteful in the early stages of economic development. Although the logic of
this argument may not be entirely denied, it should be noted that an
"artificial" monopoly eventually hampers not only economic efficiency itself,
but more importantly discourages the competitive spirit of society that is the
real engine of economic growth.
56. Secondly, the KFTC needs to develop legal rules and standards for
distinguishing anticompetitive abuses of intellectual property rights from
legitimate uses of such rights. This is particularly important in light of
the significantly enhanced protection afforded to firms investing and trading
in R & D-intensive goods.
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57. A third task is to coordinate competition policy based on the MRFTA with
other policies. In so far as competition policy provides the most fundamental
framework for market order and also contains elements of general industrial
policy, other industrial laws such as the Industrial Development Act, the
Copyright Act, and the Patent Act must be recast and enforced within the
boundary set by the MRFTA. Currently, activities "justifiable" under such
laws are exempted from the MRFTA. In a similar vein, external trade policy
must be harmonized with internal competition policy. An attempt to segregate
the two policies will be futile in the open economy. Similarly, on the
international front, competition policies of different countries must be
coordinated to apply, as far as possible, uniform rules and to promote
exchanges of information on the market conduct of firms across countries.
Such cooperation becomes more important as more firms, multinationals in
particular, expand their business activities on a global scale.
V. THE NEW AGENDA FOR THE GATT/WTO
58. The Uruguay Round trade negotiations have been concluded, and the agenda
for the next round of the world trading body is being formulated. It is
widely expected that issues of competition, the environment, and possibly
labour will be on the agenda. Some specific issues that need to be addressed
in the next round will be proposed here along with a modest proposal for
forging links between competition and trade in the context of our world
trading system.
59. Nations have antidumping laws that prohibit imports sold at less than the
home country price or otherwise less than the "fair value", where the imports
materially injure a domestic industry. Antidumping laws create international
tensions. An exporting country’s competitively priced goods are taxed on
entry into the importing country, and exporting firms believe that they have
been denied fair market access. Antidumping laws also cause internal tensions
with competition policy. Competition policy encourages sustainable low
pricing as long as it is not "predatory", whereas antidumping law counters
such low pricing in order to protect a domestic industry.
60. Much of the discussion on the conflict between competition policy and
trade policy has focused on the antidumping system, whose anti-competitive
effects have been well documented. The use of "undertakings" by exporters to
raise prices effectively amounts to collusion between domestic producers and
exporters to fix prices. Without the cover of antidumping proceedings, price
fixing resulting from "undertakings" would be a clear violation of competition
rules. Whereas it is generally agreed that pricing below average variable
cost is predatory and therefore eligible for action under competition policy,
exceptions are allowed under the antidumping system for price discrimination
that does not meet the variable cost test, and a margin of dumping may be
arbitrarily created.
61. A number of experts have argued that the anitidumping system should
itself be dumped and replaced by antitrust provisions against predatory
pricing. Others have argued for a reform of the antidumping system to bring
it more in line with competition policy, particularly with regard to the
calculation of the margins of price difference and the concept of injury to
producers. However, a nation that views the right to impose antidumping
duties as a valuable bargaining chip can hardly be expected to reconcile the
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tension between its competition policy and its antidumping laws. Other than
in the European Union, where imposing antidumping duties is a violation of the
Treaty of Rome, internal reconciliation of these tensions is rare.
Antidumping laws remain intact even within NAFTA. 8/
62. What needs to be achieved in the next round is the integration of
competition policy considerations into the workings of trade law remedies or
the contingent protection system of GATT Articles VI and XIX. Considerable
attention should be paid to the issue of antitrust/antidumping tensions. In
addition, the possibility of replacing the antidumping regime with a carefully
circumscribed extension of national competition policy provisions and
jurisdiction should be explored. It is misleading to argue that competition
law is not an adequate substitute for antidumping law owing to differences in
the antitrust provisions on price discrimination across nations. Lack of
harmonization in substantive law and in procedures should not be a major
issue.
63. We should now look at the specific problems that could arise in bringing
competition policy into a working relationship with trade policy with regard
to contingent protection measures, and engage in studies directed at the issue
of replacing antidumping procedures with existing antitrust procedures in the
post-Uruguay Round period. There may be several ways to integrate competition
policy considerations into the application of GATT Articles VI and XIX
measures. One is to take into account the competitive structure of the
domestic market when considering the granting of special, or "contingent",
protection under the antidumping, anti-subsidy, or safeguard provisions.
Producers who dominate domestic markets may be denied such special protection.
UNCTAD and other international organizations may significantly contribute to
the harmonization of antidumping systems with competition rules by providing a
forum where detailed examinations of the issue can be carried out.
64. Every nation has some form of state-action and act-of-state doctrines,
exempting government actions from antitrust provisions. Some anticompetitive
state actions are subject to GATT; others are not. State actions may be in
the form of subsidies, authorization of export cartels, standard-setting, or
conferring of competitive advantages on nationals. A widely cited, more
generic case is government authorization of export cartels, whereby a nation,
though it prohibits cartels at home, decides to profit by exploiting foreign
markets.
65. Nations in search of principles for advancing competition for their
mutual benefit could agree to refrain from government actions designed to
exploit each other or to disadvantage foreigners. Exploitative and
discriminatory state actions, and combined state/private actions, are major
items for the agenda.
66. Extraterritorial enforcement of United States antitrust law, encompassing
a broad range of discovery rights, private enforcement, class actions, treble
damage remedies, and criminal punishment, has been a source of international
tension, triggering the enactment of statutes designed to block United States
discovery and "claw back" the two-thirds (penal) portion of foreign
(United States antitrust) judgements. Extraterritorial antitrust enforcement
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is based on some form of the effects doctrine: actions extending across the
globe may directly harm competition in other nations in a globalizing world
economy, and the injured nation needs to protect itself.
67. The rationale for antitrust enforcement against foreign firms cannot
be entirely denied, particularly in the case of illegal private cartels
targeted at nationals or the markets of the regulating nation. However,
many cases do not seem to fit into this category. Some cartel actions are
government-authorized, and some private actions are regulated and allegedly
legal in the home country. Moreover, certain actions allegedly by a cartel,
may not actually be by a cartel. In such cases, extraterritorial enforcement
initiatives may cause tension between nations, with charges of "unilateralism"
and intrusion into sovereignty. The problem of jurisdictional outreach does
therefore give rise to items for the agenda, and those items should include
fairness and legitimacy of process as well as choice of law.
68. Non-enforcement of competition law in the context of the closed foreign
market problem gives rise to international tensions. Indeed, the perception
of foreign market closure is one of the most serious competition/trade
problems today. The problem became prominent in the course of the
United States-Japan Structural Impediments Initiatives, launched in 1989. The
United States announced its intention to use antitrust law to pry open foreign
markets that were closed, e.g. by domestic suppliers boycotting foreign goods.
United States officials stated that if the host country refused to enforce
its antitrust laws and thereby restrain its nationals from purchasing
United States imports, and if comity conditions could be met, the
United States would be likely to bring suit under United States law.
69. The absence of recourse to a trusted and impartial decision-maker may be
at the heart of tensions in the context of the closed foreign market problem.
Thus, dispute resolution and its legitimacy and acceptability needs to be
included on the agenda.
70. The issues of market access and presence have become central concerns
of trade policy-makers at both the national and international levels. The
heightened complementarity between trade, investment, and collaborative
agreements in global business, as well as the success in liberalizing trade
and investment unilaterally, regionally, and multilaterally have made apparent
the interlinkages between trade, investment and other domestic policies, as
well as the importance of private conduct and market structures for
international economic relations.
71. Of notable concern is the fact that the multilateral route has often been
bypassed as countries have increasingly turned to unilateral and bilateral
approaches. The issue of objectively assessing the degree of openness of a
market and measuring progress in liberalizing conditions of access and
presence has proved particularly intractable.
72. In general, unimpaired market access refers to conditions of competition
which provide foreign goods, services, service providers, and investors
opportunities to compete in a market on terms equal or comparable to those
enjoyed by locally produced goods and services and locally established firms.
However, it will be difficult to define and give substance to the notion of
conditions of competition which ensure unimpaired market access. An avenue
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possibly worth pursuing is that of establishing an illustrative list of
measures and practices deemed to impair market access. In addition, the
relative importance of various market access issues in the post-Uruguay Round
trade agenda needs to be assessed so as to determine the best means of
addressing them.
73. Institutional and policy-making responses have so far been less
than thorough, and have tended to be predicated on the assumptions of a
world economy characterized by shallow forms of integration. It seems
particularly important and timely to explore these issues and their complex
interrelationships further so as to lay the foundations for future
multilateral discussions and legislation. UNCTAD is well suited to contribute
actively to this effort, providing analytical support to deepen the
understanding of substantive issues, and to debate and develop responses for
policy-making and legislating. Such contributions could also expedite
possible future work in the WTO and other international forums.
Notes
1/ The Act had the two stated objectives of price control and assurance
of fair trade practices, but the actual implementation was focused on price
control and prohibition of hoarding and cornering of staple food products.
2/ The clause on conscious parallelism was later deleted by the
1986 amendment, as it was believed to lack any theoretical justification.
3/ The jaebol refers to the conglomerate business groups, the majority of
whose component firms are monopolistic or oligopolistic in their respective
markets, essentially owned and controlled by specific individuals or their
family members.
4/ A unique feature of the MRFTA is that the establishment of new
companies is treated as a method of business integration. This is in response
to the fact that more firms are newly established than merged in the rapidly
growing Korean economy. Of a total of 2,306 business integrations reported up
to 1992, 610 (26.4 per cent) were through the establishment of new companies.
5/ In 1987, Japan did not contest any of the 1,147 mergers notified to
its Fair Trade Commission. In the United States, 14 of the 2,256 mergers
notified to the antitrust agencies during 1987 resulted in injunctive action.
In Germany, where merger control is relatively strict, 76 mergers have been
prohibited and 143 amended or abandoned since merger control began in 1973.
See R.A. Boner and R. Krueger, The Basics of Antitrust Policy: A Review of
Ten Nations and the European Communities, World Bank Technical Paper No. 160,
1991, n. 166.
6/ N. David Palmeter, "The Antidumping Law: A Legal and Administrative
Nontariff Barrier" in R. Boltuck and R.E. Litan (eds.): Down in the
Dumps/Administration of the Unfair Trade Laws, Washington, D.C. The Brookings
Institute, 1991, at p. 87. "Raise the de minimis level of 0.5 per cent to
5 per cent. The current de minimis standard, 0.5 per cent, pretends to a
precision that is rarely achieved in antidumping investigations, and, if
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achieved, is reached only at enormous cost. A 5 per cent standard has the
virtue of being consistent with the exchange rate regulations of the
department [of Commerce], which require conversion of all currencies involved
in an antidumping investigation into United States dollars ... . It is
obvious that there is enough play in this exchange rate policy alone to make
the 0.5 per cent de minimis standard meaningless."
7/ J.F. François, N.D. Palmeter, and J.C. Anspacher, "Conceptual and
Procedural Biases in the Administration of the Countervailing Duty Law", in
Boltuck and Litan (eds.) op. cit. pp. 131-132: "Apply a 5 per cent de minimis
standard for domestic subsidies. Domestic subsidy programs do not have the
same effect on export performance as export subsidies at identical prices. In
addition, a domestic subsidy programme can be used as legitimate policy tools
and are recognized explicitly as such in the GATT Subsidies Code. Even if the
Department [of Commerce] continues with its current cash-flow approach to the
determination of subsidy rates, a higher de minimis standard for domestic
subsidies would be a simple way to recognize the distinction between export
and domestic subsidies that is drawn in the GATT Subsidies Code."
8/ The Australian-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement
provides a separate Protocol for full cooperation in enforcement by achieving
the harmonization of rules governing abuse of dominant positions while
abolishing antidumping actions.
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